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 THE DAMNEDEST TOWN THIS SIDE OF HELL: 
TAMPA, 1920-29. (PART II) 
 
By DR. FRANK ALDUINO 
 
 
The exception to this rule occurred in the 
summer of 1927 when the City Council 
appointed judge Leo Stalnaker to the 
municipal bench.27 
 
Stalnaker, a State Representative, who had 
recently gained notoriety for sponsoring a 
controversial antievolution bill, was selected 
as a temporary replacement on the bench in 
June 192 7. To retain his judgeship, he 
would have to win a special election in 
October. Despite the consequences, 
Stalmaker, in an act of defiance to the 
political establishment, quickly asserted his 
independence. Upon assuming his judicial 
duties he warned Tampa’s underworld that 
he would vigorously enforce the law. 
Stalnaker kept his word. On his first day on 
the bench the crusading magistrate quad-
rupled the customary fines and shocked the 
city by imposing stiff prison sentences for 
bolita and liquor violators.28 
 
Stalnaker’s aggressive stand against Tampa’s 
vice conditions sent many liquor violators 
scurrying for safe shelter. In fact, E. L. 
Bergstram, a federal prohibition agent in the 
city, stated: 
 
I know that many "speakeasies" and 
other places where liquor has been 
sold in the past have closed their 
doors and gone out of business. They 
are not willing to run the risk of 
being "caught with the goods." The 
closing of these places is having its 
effect on the moonshine stills. Many 
of them also are going out of 
business because the market for their 
liquor has been severely crimped.”29 
 
Although Judge Stalnaker's stern 
interpretation of the law delighted the city's 
ardent prohibitionists, it infuriated Tampa's 
political structure. Not willing to wait until 
the upcoming judicial election, Mayor Perry 
Wall demanded the immediate removal of 
the factious magistrate. Unable to secure the 
support of a majority of city commissioners, 
Wall had to wait for the October plebiscite. 
As expected, Stalnaker lost the judicial con-
test, carrying only two of twenty-six 
precincts. Despite his decisive defeat, the 
Judge Leo Stalnaker, Sr 
 
judge had three more months on the 
municipal bench before his abbreviated term 
expired. On November 27,1927, using a 
movie camera the judge recorded a vice 
sweep through Ybor City. The pictures 
would be used as evidence for future 
arrests.30 
 
The movie, which the judge entitled The 
Wages of Sin, provoked the wrath of Mayor 
Wall and other city politicians. Once again, 
they called for Stalnaker’s impeachment. 
Although many Tampans believed that the 
judge had usurped the law, he managed to 
serve out his entire appointment. For seven 
months Tampa’s underworld and its political 
allies had faced a formidable foe; illegal 
liquor and bolita operators lost a 
considerable amount of revenue while 
Stalnaker sat on the municipal bench. They 
would not soon forget this crusading 
magistrate. In fact, within a year of his 
defeat, Stalnaker was disbarred from the 
Florida Bar Association. Throughout the 
Great Depression he was forced to write 
detective stories to support his family.31 
 
Stalnaker could not be bribed, but he was 
the exception to the rule. Prohibition added 
to the public corruption already flourishing 
in Tampa. Dishonest officials allegedly 
including patrolmen, police chiefs, city 
commissioners, and even a few mayors, all 
accepted protection money. Yet, municipal 
authorities did not have a monopoly on 
graft. Throughout the "Noble Experiment," 
Hillsborough County sheriffs were as 
bribable as their municipal counterparts. For 
example, William Spencer, a county sheriff 
during the early days of Prohibition, liked to 
personally collect his graft from 
moonshiners so that "he could sample some 
of their hooch."32  Another sheriff accused 
of accepting gratuitous kickbacks was 
Luther Hiers. In September 1926, an 
affidavit signed by some of Tampa’s most 
prominent citizens accused the sheriff of 
allowing at least 101 saloons to operate 
within the county. The sworn statement also 
alleged that Hiers tolerated the bolita 
rackets, prostitution, and dope peddlers. 
Although the besieged sheriff was chastized 
by the local press, Governor John Martin 
refused to remove him.33 
 
L. M. Hatton was not so fortunate. In one of 
the closest races in Hillsborough County 
history, Hatton defeated three former 
sheriffs: L. C. Hiers, William Spencer, and 
A. J. White. In office only a few months, 
Hatton was accused of receiving $10,000 a 
month from the county’s liquor and 
gambling violators. According to an 
affidavit signed by Deputy John Harrington, 
who was Sheriff Hatton’s liaison with 
Tampa’s underworld: 
 
When Hatton became sheriff [I] was 
authorized by Hatton to make 
collections weekly of sums of money 
from persons violating the liquor and 
gambling laws, the amount of such 
collections to be fixed by the 
affidavit upon the character of the 
business done by such law 
violators.34 
 
Harrington claimed that Hatton maintained 
two lists of violators-an active and inactive. 
Individuals on the active list paid the sheriff 
and were allowed to continue their illegal 
operations. Those on the inactive list refused 
to pay the sheriff and immediately had their 
"joints" raided. Upon receiving Deputy 
Harrington’s sworn statement and other 
damaging testimony, Governor Doyle 
Carlton removed the crooked sheriff. His 
decision was later upheld by the Legislature. 
Although Hatton was replaced, subsequent 
Hillsborough County sheriffs continued to 
receive graft from the city’s underworld.35 
 
Despite convenient protection arrangements 
with county sheriffs and municipal officials, 
bootleggers still needed to use discretion 
when conducting their business. Most 
rumrunners feared the long arm of the 
federal government. When the Volstead Act 
became effective on January 16, 1920, the 
Treasury Department was ordered by 
Congress to create an additional branch of 
the Internal Revenue Bureau. It was given 
the responsibility of enforcing the national 
prohibitionary laws. This so-called 
Prohibition Unit supervised the actions of 
each of the forty-eight state Prohibition 
Directors.36 
 
Florida’s first federal prohibition chief was 
judge 0. P Hilburn. A Tampa native, World 
War I military hero, and former 
Hillsborough County Juvenile Court 
magistrate, Hilburn was selected by National 
Prohibition Director John Kramer to 
suppress the state’s liquor traffic. During the 
first months of the "Noble Experiment," 
federal authorities made a concerted effort to 
eradicate the state’s infant bootleg trade. 
Local newspapers praised Judge Hilburn’s 
resolve and efficiency. They also wrote 
glowing stories about the courageous 
exploits of his agents, especially Mayor 
Frank Williams, Tampa’s future police chief. 
Many Tampans believed H. M. Gaylord, 
Deputy Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue, when he stated that the United 
States would soon be as "dry as a desert."37 
 
Yet this prevailing sense of optimism soon 
evaporated as Florida prohibition agents 
became increasingly handicapped by several 
obstacles. First of all, throughout the "Noble 
Experiment" Congress refused to adequately 
finance the war on liquor. Periodically, state 
directors, in order to absorb budgetary cuts, 
had to release their agents. In May 1921, 
Judge Hilburn was compelled to furlough 75 
percent of his entire prohibitionary force. 
Another agency restricted by tight con-
gressional budgets was the Coast Guard. 
This branch of the Treasury Department had 
the unenviable task of controlling the 
importation of smuggled liquor and other 
contraband along Florida’s 1,200 mile 
coastline. Severely undermanned and 
lacking the necessary appropriations, the 
Guard was almost impotent in its struggle 
against better financed and more 
sophisticated rumrunners. Using high-speed, 
expensive motorboats, smugglers easily 
out-maneuvered the Coast Guard’s 
antiquated cutters.38 
 
A second problem facing federal prohibition 
was the lack of honest and efficient agents. 
Low pay, long hours, few benefits, and the 
lack of job security discouraged qualified 
applicants and bred corruption within the 
ranks of the Prohibition Unit. Throughout 
the "Noble Experiment" scores of federal 
agents (especially prior to 1927 when they 
were not covered by Civil Service 
requirements) were dismissed from the 
service for accepting bribes or consorting 
with known bootleggers. Tampa newspapers 
frequently reported the arrest or dismissal of 
dishonest prohibition agents.39 
 
Another obstacle to enforcement of the 
Eighteenth Amendment was an 
unsympathetic federal judiciary. The 
Volstead Act violators filled the courts, 
frustrating many already overworked judges. 
By 1922, more federal courts were 
desperately needed to try the massive 
volume of prohibition violators. Yet 
Congress never provided adequate funding. 
This lack of Congressional support created a 
good deal of resentment among members of 
the federal bench, which was usually 
reflected in prohibition cases. "Damp and 
wet" judges, disgruntled with the existing 
system, became excessively lenient in their 
punishment to liquor violators. Fines, 
sometimes as low as five or ten dollars, were 
not uncommon for those breaking federal 
prohibitionary statutes. judges also showed 
their displeasure with the "Noble Experi-
ment" by restricting the scope of evidence 
permitted in alcohol prosecutions. Although 
the Supreme Court had broadened search 
and seizure rules, federal judges were often 
hesitant to allow questionable evidence in 
the courtroom.40 
 
Because of this judicial hostility, prohibition 
agents found it difficult to obtain the 
necessary evidence for a solid prosecution. 
In order to have a chance for a conviction, 
agents needed to arrest a defendant in the act 
of selling illegal liquor. In Ybor City, this 
was nearly impossible. According to Tampa 
historian Anthony Pizzo, every street corner 
in the city’s Latin quarter had posted sentries 
that watched for federal agents. If one was 
spotted, a warning quickly spread 
throughout the neighborhood cafes, 
restaurants, and speakeasies. Since liquor 
was generally served in a pitcher, any 
evidence was simply destroyed by pouring it 
down a drain. When prohibition agents 
arrived at their destination, they usually 
found patrons drinking nothing but cafe con 
leche.41 
 
Throughout the Prohibition era, federal 
enforcement of the Volstead Act can be 
characterized as cyclical. In fact, federal 
enforcement patterns in Tampa were 
remarkably similar to those practiced by 
local police and county sheriffs. Federal 
agents often conducted their intensive 
crusades against bootleggers and 
moonshiners just prior to an important 
election or after the replacement of a state, 
regional, or federal prohibition director. 
 
In Tampa, the appointment of a new federal 
prohibition chief usually brought a period of 
instability for the city’s bootleggers. When 
A. L. Allen was appointed the chief federal 
agent in the State of Florida, he promised 
“vigorous and unflinching enforcement of 
all prohibition laws.”42  Within months he 
and his men captured 102 stills, 26,912 
quarts of whiskey, and 55,777 gallons of 
mash. Yet, this enthusiasm for law and order 
quickly waned. After the initial drive, 
federal prohibition arrests decreased 
considerably. Infrequent raids continued 
over the next few years, including several 
against the Florida Brewing Company. They 
increased again in 192 5 with the arrival in 
Tampa of General Lincoln Andrews. 
Appointed by President Calvin Coolidge in 
April of that year to head the Prohibition 
Bureau, Andrews conducted a massive 
nationwide campaign against bootleggers, 
moonshiners, and international smugglers. 
His first target was the leaky State of 
Florida.43 
 
In order to control the embarrassing amount 
of illicit liquor flowing into the Sunshine 
State, Andrews devised a two-pronged plan 
to curtail rum-running. His main objective 
was to completely reorganize the Prohibition 
Bureau. Every prohibition agent was fur-
loughed and thoroughly reviewed before 
being allowed to return to work. Many did 
not meet the new rigorous requirements and 
were dismissed. Assistant Treasury Director 
Andrews also replaced or transferred every 
state prohibition director in the Union. In 
Florida, A. L. Allen was succeeded by 
Benjamin Simmons, an exbrigadier general 
who supposedly had no political connections 
and was given the job solely because of his 
superior administrative skills. Simmons was 
given a free hand in selecting his agents.44  
As his primary assistant, Simmons chose 
Phillip Hambsch, a retired navy 
lieutenant-commander who had starred on 
the football team at the Naval Academy. 
 
Andrews’ second course of action in his 
quest to crush the liquor trade in Tampa and 
the rest of Florida involved the Coast Guard. 
General Andrews, in order to block the 
importation of spirits during the busy tourist 
months, transferred the large Rum Fleet 
stationed off New York, New Jersey, and 
New England to the Sunshine State. 
Andrews planned to seal the Florida coast 
before northern rumrunners had a chance to 
deliver their goods into the state. "When the 
rum fleet arrives it will pursue the 
rumrunners just as a fishing smack follows a 
mackerel,”45 intoned Captain John Berry, 
Commander of the Florida Coast Guard. He 
continued by warning potential smugglers,  
 
"If this foreign fleet, which has been 
laughing at the law in eastern waters, 
dares to hoist anchors and head for 
Florida, it will be a most dangerous 
move it ever made. We are prepared 
to meet any of the vessels whose 
skippers think they can ignore the 
law and reap a harvest in Florida."46 
 
The combined activities of Director 
Simmons and Captain Berry had a 
tremendous effect on the supply of imported 
liquor in Tampa. It was reported that the 
“squeeze" doubled the price of scotch 
whiskey to nearly $25.00 a quart. 
Furthermore, cafes, restaurants, and other 
liquor emporiums that formerly did a 
thriving business either temporarily closed 
their establishments or sold their customers 
moonshine. Although this colored "shine" 
was barely fit for human consumption, a 
thirsty public was willing to pay as much as 
$10.00 a quart for the inferior liquid.47 
 
Surprisingly, this effective crusade lasted for 
over eight months. With General Andrews 
personally directing the operation from 
Florida, the federal government maintained 
a tough enforcement policy. In fact, in July 
1926, Andrews added a new weapon to his 
arsenal - airplanes. Docked on Davis Island, 
these aircraft were flown by navy and army 
pilots. They were equipped with machine 
guns to fire upon smugglers who resisted 
arrest. Although few of these "Rum Planes" 
ever encountered bootleggers, they 
nonetheless provided essential intelligence 
for federal officials. Flying high above the 
earth, they charted and patrolled the 
labyrinth of waterways and inlets used as 
landing spots by smugglers. Apparently, the 
Air Force and other federal agencies 
continued to wreak havoc on Tampa's rum 
trade throughout the early months of 1926. 
Even Izzy Einstein, the legendary 
prohibition agent from New York, noticed 
Tampa's shortage of quality alcohol. While 
visiting his brother in the city Einstein 
commented: "Everyone [in Tampa] seems 
happy, sober and orderly, and I haven't seen 
a single drink since I came. One glass of 
buttermilk was the most intoxicating thing I 
could get to drink in a couple of restaurants I 
tried.”48 
 
Despite an impressive record against the 
bootleg trade, the federal crusade suddenly 
ended in late 1926. Lack of funds, apathy 
and corruption allowed Tampa's rumrunners 
to soon reestablish their lucrative businesses. 
While intermittent crackdowns on suspected 
liquor violators continued throughout the 
remaining years of the "Noble Experiment," 
there was not another coordinated effort to 
crush the importation of smuggled liquor in 
Tampa. The Great Depression and the 
Wickersham report which "documented the 
breakdown of enforcement and impossibility 
of imposing aridity on a determined 
minority," assured that the federal 
government would do little to dry-up the 
city of Tampa, as well as the rest of the 
nation.49 
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